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1. INTRODUCTION
An increasingly large number of lawsuits, particularly at the federal
level, are seeking relief under Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practices Act ("FDUTPA"), Florida Statutes sections 501.201-.213
(2010). Many of these lawsuits involve multiple plaintiffs or seek class
certification. These factors inevitably intensify the number and complex-
ity of FDUTPA claims. Although FDUTPA is a state consumer-protec-
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graduate of Vanderbilt University School of Law. He is the head of the firm's Class Action Task
Force and focuses his practice on complex business litigation, including antitrust, insurance, trade,
and appellate law. In addition, he is Board Certified by the Florida Bar in Antitrust and Trade
Regulation Law.
** David L. Luck is an associate with Carlton Fields in Miami, Florida, and is a member of
the firm's Appellate and Trial Support practice group. Mr. Luck is a 2007 graduate of the
University of Miami School of Law and an alumnus and former Executive Editor of the University
of Miami Law Review. Before joining Carlton Fields, Mr. Luck clerked for Justice R. Fred Lewis
of the Supreme Court of Florida.
*** Leah A. Sevi is an associate with Carlton Fields in Tampa, Florida, and is also a member
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Law School and is an alumna and former Article Editor of the Harvard Journal of Law and
Technology.
1. See, for example, Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A. v. Banner, No. 4DO9-3928, 2010
WL 5346669, at *1 (Fla. 4th DCA Dec. 29, 2010), where the court affirmed a FDUTPA class-
1083
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
tion statute, courts have noted that "the vast majority of cases analyzing
FDUTPA are federal." 2
This article provides a broad overview regarding FDUTPA's pur-
pose and the parameters of a private claim alleging a deceptive, unfair,
or unconscionable act or practice "in the conduct of any trade or com-
merce." 3 In particular, we focus on the tests for deception, unfairness,
and unconscionability and how these tests relate to analogous federal
consumer-protection law. At least three circumstances have likely con-
tributed to FDUTPA's "federal flavor." First, FDUTPA (a) states that it
"shall be construed liberally to promote" the policy of making Florida
consumer-protection law "consistent with established policies of federal
law relating to consumer protection," (b) defines statutory violations
with reference to Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") rules and federal
law which define the "standards of unfairness and deception," and (c)
provides that "great weight shall be given to the interpretations of the
[FTC] and the federal courts relating to" analogous provisions of the
FTC Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006)).4 Second, FDUTPA cases may
certification order as to a large group of mortgage borrowers that received reinstatement letters
from the defendant-law firm, which demanded payment for fees and costs that the plaintiffs
contended were unreasonable, excessive, or not currently due and owing.
2. Kelly v. Palmer, Reifler & Assocs., P.A., 681 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1373 n.8 (S.D. Fla. 2010)
(citing Kertesz v. Net Transactions, Ltd., 635 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1350 n.3 (S.D. Fla. 2009));
Beacon Prop. Mgmt., Inc. v. PNR, Inc., 890 So. 2d 274, 278 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).
3. FLA. STAT. §§ 501.202(2), 501.203(8), 501.204(1) (2010). Consistent with FDUTPA's
ambitious scope, the statutory definition of "trade or commerce" is particularly broad:
"Trade or commerce" means the advertising, soliciting, providing, offering, or
distributing, whether by sale, rental, or otherwise, of any good or service, or any
property, whether tangible or intangible, or any other article, commodity, or thing of
value, wherever situated. "Trade or commerce" shall include the conduct of any
trade or commerce, however denominated, including any nonprofit or not-for-profit
person or activity.
Id. § 501.203(8).
4. Id. §§ 501.202(3), .203(3)(a)-(b), .204(2), .205(2); see also Mark S. Fistos, Per Se
Violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, FLA. B.J., May 2002, at 62,
66 (describing FDUTPA as a "statute of reference" that incorporates other bodies of law).
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trigger federal diversity,' class-action, 6 or pendant jurisdiction.' Third,
federal trial and appellate decisions are often published, while only state
appellate decisions8 find their way into the Southern Reporter. Because
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has appellate
jurisdiction over Florida's federal district courts,9 it may play a signifi-
cant role in developing FDUTPA precedent-either on its own or by
certifying cause-determinative questions of state law to the Supreme
Court of Florida.'o
A. History
During the 1960s, certain groups and constituencies, including the
FTC and several legal commentators, began to advocate the view that
traditional common-law remedies in tort and contract (and the FTC's
regulatory efforts) were inadequate to remedy unfair or deceptive trade
practices affecting consumers." The FTC Act provided only limited
relief, as the federal courts had consistently declined to hold that it per-
mitted injured parties a private right of action.12 Moreover, the FTC had
limited enforcement resources." Accordingly, the agency urged states to
pass new legislation giving consumers a private right of action against
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006); Terminix Int'l Co., LP v. Palmer Ranch Ltd. P'ship, 432
F.3d 1327, 1329 (1lth Cir. 2005) (deciding a FDUTPA claim initially filed in the Middle District
of Florida under diversity jurisdiction); Hetrick v. Ideal Image Dev. Corp., No. 8:07-cv-87 I-T-
33TBM, 2008 WL 5317363, at *4 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (noting that the plaintiff removed the
FDUTPA suit to the Middle District of Florida "on the basis of complete diversity of
citizenship").
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d); Francisco v. Numismatic Guar. Corp. of Am., No. 06-61677-
CIV, 2008 WL 649124, at *6 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (finding that it had subject matter jurisdiction over
the FDUTPA claim because "the amount in controversy in [the] class action was alleged to exceed
$5,000,000.00 in the aggregate" and diversity existed among members of the class); Grillasca v.
Hess Corp., No. 8:05-cv-1736-T-17-TGW, 2007 WL 2121726, at *5 (M.D. Fla. 2007) ("[I]n the
context of a class action[,] District Courts shall have original jurisdiction over any civil matter in
which the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000.00 and any member of the plaintiff class is a
citizen of a State different than any defendant.").
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; Traffic Jam Events, LLC v. Cortes, No.6:09-cv-146-Orl-19GJK,
2009 WL 2175640, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 21, 2009) (exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the
FDUTPA claim because the claim "[fell] squarely within the same nucleus of operative fact as the
federal claim").
8. In other words, decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida and Florida's five district
courts of appeal.
9. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 1291 (2006).
10. See FLA. CONsT. Art. V, § 3(b)(6) (noting that the Supreme Court of Florida "[m]ay
review a question of law certified by the Supreme Court of the United States or a United States
Court of Appeals which is determinative of the cause and for which there is no controlling
precedent of the supreme court of Florida").
11. Note, Toward Greater Equality in Business Transactions: A Proposal to Extend the Little
FTC Acts to Small Businesses, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1621, 1621-22 (1983).
12. Id.
13. Id.
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unfair or deceptive trade practices.' 4
In 1964, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws ("NCCUSL") approved a model "Little FTC Act," the Uni-
form Deceptive Trade Practices Act.15 Subsequently, the Council of
State Governments proposed a second model statute, the Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Act. 16 In 1970, the NCCUSL drafted
a third model statute, the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act."
Within a decade following promulgation of the initial model "Little FTC
Act," every state except Alabama enacted some form of general con-
sumer-protection legislation.' Most provided a private right of action.'"
With the "Little FTC Act," i.e., the Uniform Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices Act, as its model, the Florida Legislature enacted FDUTPA in
1973.20 The Legislature has amended FDUTPA several times during the
intervening decades, 2 ' however, and the Act is now unique in the extent
to which it references federal consumer-protection law.22
B. Purpose
FDUTPA exists "to protect the consuming public and legitimate
business enterprises from those who engage in [1] unfair methods of
competition, or [2] unconscionable, deceptive, or unfair acts or practices
in the conduct of any trade or commerce." 23 Thus, the Act regulates two
distinct categories of prohibited business behavior: First, unfair competi-
tion (which may include, inter alia, antitrust violations); 24 and second,
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1623.
16. Id. at 1624.
17. Id. at 1625 n.28.
18. Id. at 1622 n.6. Today, Alabama has also enacted a Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices
Act. See ALA. CODE, H§ 8-19-1 to -15 (1975). Alabama initially adopted this legislation in 1981.
See generally 1981 Ala. Acts, No. 81-355.
19. Note, supra note 11, at 1622 n.6.
20. See 1973 Fla. Laws 189, § 1; David J. Federbush, The Unexplored Territory of
Unfairness in Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, FLA. B.J., May 1999, at 26.
21. See, e.g., 1979 Fla. Laws 1936, § 1; 1983 Fla. Laws 381, § 1; 1985 Fla. Laws 409, § 4;
1990 Fla. Laws 858, §§ 1, 2; 1991 Fla. Laws 2102, § 37; 1993 Fla. Laws 207, 209, 212, §§ 1, 2,
3, 12; 1997 Fla. Laws 638, § 24; 2001 Fla. Laws 113-14, 116, §§ 1, 2, 6; 2001 Fla. Laws
1922-24, §§ 22, 23, 27; 2006 Fla. Laws 2072, §§ 1, 2.
22. David J. Federbush, Obtaining Relief For Deceptive Practices Under FDUTPA, FLA. B.J.,
Nov. 2001, at 29 ("[FDUTPA] is unique among [state "little FTC" consumer-protection laws] in
expressing the purpose of achieving consistency with established policies of federal law relating to
consumer protection.").
23. FLA. STAT. § 501.202(2) (2010); see also, e.g., Citibank (S.D.) N.A. v. Nat'1 Arbitration
Council, Inc., Nos. 3:04-cv-1076-J-32MCR & 3:04-cv-1205-J-20MCR, 2006 WL 2691528, at *3
(M.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2006).
24. See generally Steven Fox, Litigation Under Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practices Act, The Florida Antitrust Act, or Federal Antitrust Statutes, in BUSINESS LIflGATION IN
FLORIDA 20-1 (6th ed. 2010).
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(a) unconscionable, (b) deceptive, or (c) unfair acts or practices. 25 This
article focuses on the tests defining the second category and its three
subsets of prohibited business behavior.
While FDUTPA does not explicitly define "deceptive" and
"unfair," it incorporates by reference the FTC's interpretation of these
terms, which have recognized legal meanings. 2 6 According to the FTC, a
"deceptive act or practice" encompasses "a representation, omission or
practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the
circumstances, to the consumer's detriment."2 7 Under current FTC
authority, an "unfair act or practice" is one that satisfies three tests: "[1]
It must be substantial; [2] it must not be outweighed by any counter-
vailing benefits to consumers or competition that the practice produces;
and [3] it must be an injury that consumers themselves could not reason-
ably have avoided."2 8 in contrast, the FTC has not defined "unconscio-
nability" as a distinct concept, and it is unclear what the Florida
Legislature intended when it added "unconscionable acts or practices" as
a separate, prohibited business behavior in 1993.29
At a macro level, courts have interpreted FDUTPA as intending to
protect the consuming public from deceptive, unfair, or unconscionable
business acts or practices.3 0 Stated rather bluntly, the Act protects "the
25. See also § 501.204(1) ("Unfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices,
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby
declared unlawful.").
26. See § 501.203(3)(b). Despite the fact that these terms have legal meanings, whether an act
or practice is "deceptive" or "unfair" under FDUTPA is generally a question of fact. See, e.g., JDI
Holdings, L.L.C. v. Jet Mgmt., Inc., No. 3:07cv242/MCR/EMT, 2010 WL 3119793, at *19 (N.D.
Fla. Aug. 6, 2010) (noting that conduct constituting an unfair or deceptive trade practice is a
question of fact) (citing Witt v. La Gorce Country Club, Inc., 35 So. 3d 1033, 1040 (Fla. 3d DCA
2010)).
27. FTC POLICY STIATEMENT ON DFcurrION, appended to Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C.
110, 174 app. (1984) [hereinafter "FTC DECE1fION Poi.icy STATEMENr"], available at http://
www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm see also, e.g., Global Tel*Link Corp. v. Scott, 652
F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1249 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
28. FTC PoIcy SrATEMENT ON UNFAIRNESS, appended to Int'l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C.
949, 1070 (1984) [hereinafter "FTC UNFAIRNESS POLICY STATEMENT"], available at http://
www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm. However, many Florida decisions still employ the
now-abandoned, prior FTC standard: An "unfair act or practice" is "one that offends established
public policy and one that is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially
injurious to consumers." PNR, Inc. v. Beacon Prop. Mgmt., 842 So. 2d 773, 777 (Fla. 2003)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Federbush, supra note 20, at 28-32.
29. See 1993 Fla. Laws 209, § 3. See generally David J. Federbush, The Unclear Scope of
Unconscionability in FDUTPA, FLA. B.J., Aug. 2000, at 49.
30. See, e.g., Holt v. O'Brien Imports of Fort Myers, Inc., 862 So. 2d 87, 89 (Fla. 2d DCA
2003) ("FDUTPA is designed to protect not only the rights of litigants, but also the rights of the
consuming public at large.") (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Edgewater By The Bay,
LLLP, 419 B.R. 511, 515 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009) (substantially similar).
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unwary from being 'conned"' by "fly-by-night business ventures." 3'
Individual or class lawsuits for money damages and equitable relief (i.e.,
the micro level) happen to be a chosen enforcement mechanism. 32 Pri-
vate FDUTPA suits for money damages and equitable relief presumably
provide an additional deterrent against such ventures alongside the
injunctive, declaratory, and monetary-penalty authority FDUTPA con-
fers on the Florida Department of Legal Affairs and Florida's twenty
State Attorney's Offices."
The Act is remedial in nature and targets consumer exploitation.34
In this regard, section 501.202 provides that FDUTPA "shall be con-
strued liberally"35 to promote the following policies:
(1) To simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing consumer
protection, unfair methods of competition, and unconscionable,
deceptive, and unfair trade practices.
(2) To protect the consuming public and legitimate business enter-
prises from those who engage in unfair methods of competition,
or unconscionable, deceptive, or unfair acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce.
(3) To make state consumer protection and enforcement consistent
with established policies of federal law relating to consumer
36
protection.
The Act's private-action component was originally designed to
"make consumers whole" for losses caused by deceptive or unfair con-
sumer practices.37 Subsequent case law, however, has clarified that con-
sequential damages are unavailable and has restricted the type and scope
31. Packaging Corp. Int'l. v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1480, 1483 (S.D. Fla. 1983);
Black v. Dep't of Legal Affairs, 353 So. 2d 655, 656 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
32. See FLA. STAT. § 501.211 (2010). A private FDUTPA lawsuit may address a consistent
deceptive, unfair, or unconscionable business practice or even a "single unfair or deceptive act[ ]
in the conduct of any trade or commerce, even if it involves only a single party, a single
transaction, or a single contract." PNR, Inc., 842 So. 2d at 777.
33. See §§ 501.203(2), .206, .207, .2075, .208, .209 (detailing the enforcement powers of the
Florida Department of Legal Affairs and the State Attorney under FDUTPA); see also S.D.S.
Autos, Inc. v. Chrzanowski, 976 So. 2d 600, 609-10 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) ("FDUTPA provides
for public and private enforcement alike. . . . But public enforcement resources are necessarily
limited. Reflecting this reality-and against the backdrop of class action availability-the Act
created a private cause of action for consumers aggrieved by FDUTPA violations.").
34. See, e.g., Fonte v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 903 So. 2d 1019, 1024 (Fla. 4th DCA
2005) ("FDUTPA is a remedial statute designed to protect consumers.").
35. Cf, e.g., JPG Enters., Inc. v. McLellan, 31 So. 3d 821, 825 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)
("Remedial statutes are entitled to a liberal construction so as to advance the remedy provided
where it is consistent with the legislative purpose.").
36. See also Samuels v. King Motor Co. of Ft. Lauderdale, 782 So. 2d 489, 499 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2001); Bert Smith Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Franklin, 400 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
37. LaFemey v. Scott Smith Oldsmobile, Inc., 410 So. 2d 534, 536 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
(quoting Marshall v. W & L Enters. Corp., 360 So. 2d 1147, 1148 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978),
disapproved on other grounds by Hubbel v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 758 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 2000)).
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of damages available under FDUTPA to "actual damages." These dam-
ages are measured by (1) a value differential between the good or ser-
vice provided and the good or service the consumer bargained for or
intended to purchase, or (2) when the good or service is rendered value-
less, the purchase price." Thus, it appears that the "making whole"
rationale is no longer a realistic description of FDUTPA's purpose and
function." A more realistic interpretation may be that FDUTPA's pri-
vate-damages component removes only the direct taint of the deceptive,
unfair, or unconscionable act or practice, while its declaratory, equitable,
and monetary-penalty components restrain and discourage the offending
act or practice.
C. FDUTPA Exemptions
Despite its broad application to deceptive, unfair, or unconsciona-
ble trade acts or practices, FDUTPA is subject to statutory and deci-
sional exemptions. For instance, Florida Statutes section 501.21240
provides that FDUTPA does not apply to:
* Acts or practices required or permitted under federal or state law; 4 1
* A publisher/information disseminator's provision of information on
behalf of another without actual knowledge that the provided infor-
mation violates FDUTPA;
* Claims for personal injury or death;4 2
38. See, e.g., Beale v. Biomet, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1374 n.12 (S.D. Fla. 2007)
(limiting plaintiffs' potential FDUTPA damages to the value differential--or, perhaps, purchase
price-applicable to a prosthetic medical device); Dorestin v. Hollywood Imps., Inc., 45 So. 3d
819, 824-25 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) ("Proof of actual damages is necessary to sustain a FDUTPA
claim. The statute does not allow the recovery of other damages, such as consequential damages.")
(internal citation omitted); Rodriguez v. Recovery Performance & Marine, L.L.C., 38 So. 3d 178,
180-81 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (holding that plaintiff-purchaser of defective jet-boat could not
recover as damages the down payment, payments on the financing loan, interest, or balance on the
loan under FDUTPA-instead, "the proper measure of actual damages [wals the difference
between the market value of the jet-boat as delivered and market value as it should have been
delivered").
39. See Dorestin, 45 So. 3d at 825-30 (Gross, C.J., concurring specially) (recognizing that
current FDUTPA damages precedent is not well-tailored to making an injured consumer
"whole"); David J. Federbush, Damages Under FDUTPA, FLA. B.J., May 2004, at 20, 20-25, 28
(making similar observations).
40. FLA. STAT. § 501.212 (2010).
41. See, e.g., Prohias v. AstraZeneca Pharm., L.P., 958 So. 2d 1054, 1055-56 (Fla. 3d DCA
2007) (affirming dismissal of attempted class action and holding that FDA-approved labeling
permitted pharmaceutical company's challenged advertising and promotional efforts). But see Fla.
Office of Att'y Gen., Dep't of Legal Affairs v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1288,
1310 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (finding that the conclusory averment that healthcare provider's charges
were permitted by Medicare regulations was insufficient to trigger the "required or permitted"
FDUTPA exemption).
42. See, e.g., Fojtasek v. NCL (Bah.) Ltd., 613 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2009)
(granting defense motion to dismiss as to plaintiff's FDUTPA claim that his decedent perished as
the result of a cruise-line shore excursion).
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* Claims for property damage, other than damage to the consumer
product at issue;
* Persons or activities regulated by the Florida Office of Insurance
Regulation ;43
* Banks and savings-and-loan associations regulated under federal or
state law;"4
* Persons or activities regulated by the Florida Department of Finan-
cial Services;45
* Persons or activities regulated by the Florida Public Service
Commission;46
* Acts or practices involving the sale, lease, rental, or appraisal of
real property committed by licensed real-estate agents, brokers, or
appraisers that violate applicable portions of Florida Statutes chap-
ter 475;
* Commercial real-property disputes when a written contract pro-
vides for a dispute-resolution process; 47 and
* Claims regarding the failure to maintain real property that are cov-
ered by applicable building, housing, and health codes, which
already provide effective relief.
In addition, FDUTPA claims may be preempted by federal law. For
example, in Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A, Inc.,48 the Southern District of
Florida addressed a patent dispute and granted the plaintiffs summary
judgment motion as to the defendant-corporation's FDUTPA counter-
claim. The court did so because the defendant's counterclaim implicated
the issue of co-inventorship, which "is a field that is governed exclu-
sively by federal patent law."49 Florida federal courts also have recog-
43. See, e.g., Zarrella v. Pac. Life Ins. Co., No. 10-60754-CIV, 2010 WL 4663296, at *6
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2010); Ebeh v. Saint Paul Travelers, No. 8:09-cv-2628-T-27TBM, 2010 WL
5553687, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2010) (describing FDUTPA's insurance exemption).
44. Bankers Trust Co. v. Basciano, 960 So. 2d 773, 778-79 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (recognizing
that FDUTPA exempts regulated banks). But see Acciard v. Whitney, No. 2:07-cv-476-UA-DNF,
2008 WL 5120898, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 4, 2008) (holding that issue of whether bank was a
regulated bank exempted under FDUTPA could not be resolved through a motion to dismiss but
could be raised via a motion for summary judgment).
45. See Sonic Auto., Inc. v. Galura, 961 So. 2d 961, 966 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (narrowing
definition of class to exclude purchasers of auto theft-deterrent etchings where the motor vehicle
service agreements memorializing these purchases were regulated by the Florida Department of
Insurance, the predecessor of the Department of Financial Services).
46. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Feo, 24 So. 3d 737, 738 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (granting writ
of prohibition and ordering FDUTPA claim dismissed because the Florida Public Service
Commission had exclusive jurisdiction over the allegations contained in the plaintiffs' FDUTPA
claim against a regulated electric utility).
47. See Sundance Apartments I, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 581 F. Supp. 2d 1215,
1222-23 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (holding that commercial real-estate transaction could not qualify for
FDUTPA exemption where the pertinent contract did not expressly specify a dispute-resolution
process).
48. Nos. 07-80435-CIV & 08-61862, 2010 WL 375796, at *4-5 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2010).
49. Id. at *4.
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nized that the National Bank Acts may preempt certain FDUTPA
claims, 0 that the Bankruptcy Code preempts FDUTPA claims arising
from an allegedly abusive bankruptcy filing," that the Copyright Act
preempts FDUTPA claims that merely repackage copyright-infringe-
ment claims,5 2 and that federal maritime law may preempt certain
FDUTPA damages claims. One Florida federal court has also held that
the provision of traditional legal services generally does not constitute
"trade or commerce" within the meaning of Florida Statutes section
501.203(8) and thus does not fall within the ambit of FDUTPA.54 There-
fore, while FDUTPA's reach is broad, one must remain cognizant of its
jurisdictional limitations and potential arguments that applying
FDUTPA would be inconsistent with other existing bodies of law.
D. Primary Focus and Issues Not Covered
The remainder of this article addresses the basic tests necessary to
establish the first element of a private FDUTPA damages claim alleging
a deceptive, unfair, or unconscionable business act or practice.5 5 As
noted above, both state and federal courts interpret and apply FDUTPA,
which is why interested parties who are addressing FDUTPA issues
should examine decisions from federal courts, including the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals and Florida's federal district courts, in addition
to decisions from the Supreme Court of Florida and Florida's state dis-
trict courts of appeal.
There are, however, a number of FDUTPA issues that we do not
address here. Among these are: What constitutes a claim for unfair
methods of competition under FDUTPA?56 Who is a proper FDUTPA
50. Spinelli v. Capital One Bank, 265 F.R.D. 598, 604-05 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (limiting class
period based on defendant's later-acquired status as a nationally chartered bank subject to federal
regulation).
51. Pariseau v. Asset Acceptance, L.L.C., 395 B.R. 492, 494-95 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008).
52. Millennium Travel & Promotions, Inc. v. Classic Promotions & Premiums, Inc., No. 6:08-
cv-290-Orl-28KRS, 2008 WL 2275555, at *3 (M.D. Fla. June 2, 2008).
53. F.W.F., Inc. v. Detroit Diesel Corp., 494 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1352-53 (S.D. Fla. 2007)
(noting that federal maritime law, not FDUTPA, controlled claims regarding the provision of
allegedly deficient yacht-repair services).
54. Kelly v. Palmer, Reifler, & Assocs., P.A., 681 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1374-77 (S.D. Fla.
2010).
55. See FLA. STAT. §§ 501.204(1), .211(2) (2010).
56. See generally Fox, supra note 24. See also Federbush, supra note 39, at 20 (noting that
"[in unfair methods of competition cases . . . FDUTPA essentially adopts federal antitrust
precedent").
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party plaintiff?" Who is a proper party defendant?58 To what extent
does FDUTPA jurisdiction extend (i.e., what connection to Florida is
sufficient to trigger FDUTPA)? 59 What role does individual reliance
play when proving causation and damages?60 These are important
FDUTPA topics for practitioners, courts, and legal commentators, and
by choosing not to focus on those issues, we do not intend to minimize
their significance.
H. THE PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION
A. FDUTPA: The Elements of the Cause of Action
Florida Statutes section 501.204(1) provides that "[u]nfair methods
of competition, unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce" are unlawful.
As alluded to above, the State, through the Department of Legal Affairs
and Florida's State Attorney's Offices, may regulate unlawful activi-
57. See, e.g., Intercoastal Realty, Inc. v. Tracy, 706 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1335 (S.D. Fla. 2010)
(acknowledging, but not resolving, a "split in authority concerning whether individual, non-
consumer plaintiffs have standing to seek monetary damages under FDUTPA"); see also
Federbush, supra note 22, at 30 (noting that the 2001 amendments to FDUTPA's "consumer"
definition and their substitution of the term "person" for "consumer" under Florida Statutes
section 501.211(2) "may give rise to a rebuttable presumption that nonconsumers are now
permitted to seek monetary damages when challenged practices are likely to harm consumers" but
explaining that such a reading would likely be inconsistent with FDUTPA's overall consumer-
protection purpose).
58. See, e.g., KC Leisure, Inc. v. Haber, 972 So. 2d 1069, 1074 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)
(discussing FDUTPA suits against individuals, as opposed to entity defendants, and explaining
that "to proceed against an individual using a FDUTPA violation theory an aggrieved party must
allege that the individual was a direct participant in the improper dealings") (emphasis added);
Nationwide Mut. Co. v. Ft. Myers Total Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1287-88 (M.D.
Fla. 2009) (substantially similar).
59. See generally Jennifer C. Erdelyi, Note, The Extraterritorial Application of the Florida
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act: State Appellate Cases Addressing the Issue, 28 NOVA
L. REV. 817 (2004).
60. Florida Statutes section 501.211(2) provides that a person may recover "actual damages"
if that person establishes he or she "suffered a loss as a result of a [FDUTPA] violation."
§ 501.211(2) (emphasis added). This language appears, rather clearly, to require that a FDUTPA
plaintiff prove individualized, actual damage proximately caused by a FDUTPA violation.
However, in the deceptive-practice context, the issue of whether individual reliance is required to
establish causation and damages is still questioned in some cases. Compare, e.g., Black Diamond
Props., Inc. v. Haines, 940 So. 2d 1176, 1179 & n.l (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) ("[A]lthough reliance
might not be an element of one claim, each plaintiff still must demonstrate that the
misrepresentation occurred and actually caused damage to him or her, which necessitates
individual proof in each case.") (emphasis added), and Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Hines, 883
So. 2d 292, 294-95 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (recognizing that questions of individual causation arise
when a plaintiff attempts to prove causation and damages under section 501.211(2)), with Davis v.
Powertel, Inc., 776 So. 2d 971, 974-75 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (failing to differentiate among the
three separate elements of a FDUTPA deceptive-practice damages claim-(I) a deceptive act or
practice; (2) causation; and (3) actual damages-and simply stating "members of a class
proceeding under [FDUTPA] need not prove individual reliance on the alleged representation").
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ties.6 1 In addition, consumers may bring private causes of action seeking
equitable or legal relief.6 2 The Act provides that "[i]n any action brought
by a person who has suffered a loss as a result of a violation of
[FDUTPA], such person may recover actual damages, plus attorney's
fees and court costs. ... A private damages claim thus requires proof
of three elements: (1) a deceptive, unconscionable,' or unfair act or
practice; (2) causation; and (3) actual damages.6 5 By contrast, if an indi-
vidual is seeking injunctive relief, rather than damages, the consumer
need not establish that the unlawful act caused a loss. 6 6 Private
FDUTPA claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations. 7
Despite FDUTPA's broad prohibition, the Florida Supreme Court
ruled in 1976 that Florida Statutes section 501.204(1) was neither
unconstitutionally vague nor indefinite.6 8 Several aspects of the statute
provide the specificity needed to pass constitutional muster. First,
FDUTPA section 501.204(2) provides that courts should give "due con-
sideration and great weight" to FTC and federal judicial interpretations
of what is unfair or deceptive under the FTC Act. 6 9 Furthermore,
because FDUTPA's "unfair" or "deceptive" language mimics the FTC
61. See statutes cited supra note 33 (detailing the enforcement authority of the Florida
Department of Legal Affairs and the State Attorney under FDUTPA); see also, e.g., Office of the
Attn'y Gen., Dep't of Legal Affairs v. Commerce Commercial Leasing, L.L.C., 946 So. 2d 1253
(Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Millennium Commc'ns. & Fulfillment, Inc. v. Office of the Att'y Gen., 761
So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).
62. § 501.211(1).
63. § 501.211(2). The award of attorney's fees under FDUTPA is discretionary and is
generally based on prevailing-party status. See, e.g., Humane Soc'y of Broward Cnty., Inc. v. Fla.
Humane Soc'y, 951 So. 2d 966, 969 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) ("The plain meaning of section
501.2105(1) admits of only one interpretation, that the legislature gave trial courts the discretion
to award prevailing party attorney fees to both plaintiffs and defendants under the same
standards.").
64. For the most part, existing case law does not acknowledge FDUTPA's separate
"unconscionability" subcategory, but consistent with the plain text of section 501.204(1), we have
included it here. See also Federbush, supra note 29.
65. See Gentry v. Haborage Cottages-Stuart, LLLP, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1256 (S.D. Fla.
2009); Rebman v. Follett Higher Educ. Grp., 248 F.R.D. 624, 631 (M.D. Fla. 2008); Marino v.
Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 245 F.R.D. 729, 737 (S.D. Fla. 2007); Bookworld Trade, Inc. v.
Daughters of Saint Paul, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1364 (M.D. Fla. 2007); Wright v. Emory, 41
So. 3d 290, 292 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Kia Motors Am. Corp. v. Butler, 985 So. 2d 1133, 1140
(Fla. 3d DCA 2008); KC Leisure, Inc. v. Haber, 972 So. 2d 1069, 1073 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).
66. See § 501.211(1); Kelly v. Palmer, Reifler, & Assocs., P.A., 681 F. Supp. 2d 1356,
1365-66 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
67. See FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(f) (2010); Brown v. Nationscredit Fin. Servs. Corp., 32 So. 3d
661, 662 n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); S. Motor Co. of Dade Cnty. v. Doktorczyk, 957 So. 2d 1215,
1217 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).
68. Dep't of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So. 2d 257, 263 (Fla. 1976). Of note, at that time
FDUTPA did not address unconscionable acts or practices. Thus, as to that category, vagueness
concerns might persist. See Federbush, supra note 29, at 54-55.
69. § 501.204(2).
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Act, well-established meanings from the common law and federal trade
law apply.70 Finally, the Act cabins what constitutes a violation of its
terms to a set of limited sources. Section 501.203(3) provides that a
"violation of this part"-that is, a finding of deception, unfairness, or
unconscionability-may be based on:
(1) Any rules promulgated pursuant to the FTC Act or FDUTPA;
(2) The standards of unfairness or deception set forth and interpreted
by the FTC or the federal courts; or
(3) Any law, statute, rule, regulation, or ordinance which proscribes
unfair methods of competition, or unfair, deceptive, or uncon-
scionable acts or practices.
To maintain a private cause of action for damages, a consumer
must suffer an actual injury or loss (i.e., actual damages) due to the
alleged deceptive or unfair trade practice." Concomitantly, to be a
member of a FDUTPA damages class action, an individual must have
been harmed.72 The harm cannot be speculative.7 3
B. Pleading Requirements for Private Actions for Damages
To satisfactorily state a FDUTPA claim, a plaintiff must plead ulti-
mate facts, not conclusions, which establish that the plaintiff was actu-
ally aggrieved by an unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive act or practice
committed by a defendant in the course of trade or commerce. 74 As to
deceptive acts or practices, the pleaded facts must establish that decep-
tion is "probable," not just "possible."7 ' Furthermore, to state a decep-
tive-practice claim, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant's practice
would likely have deceived a reasonable person under the same circum-
stances.7 6 To recover FDUTPA damages, the plaintiff must allege not
only that the complained-of conduct was unfair, unconscionable, or
deceptive, but also that the plaintiff was aggrieved by this conduct.
70. Rogers, 329 So. 2d at 264-65.
71. See Smith v. Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., 663 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2009)
(distinguishing viable FDUTPA claim from the dismissed claim of Prohias v. Pfizer, Inc., 485
F. Supp. 2d 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2007), where the Prohias plaintiffs' purchases would have occurred,
regardless of the deception, due to product's other attributes); see also Gen. Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Laesser, 718 So. 2d 276, 277 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ("To be actionable[,] an unfair or
deceptive trade practice must be the cause of loss or damage to a consumer.").
72. Turner Greenberg Assocs. v. Pathman, 885 So. 2d 1004, 1007 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).
73. See Macias v. HBC of Fla., Inc., 694 So. 2d 88, 90 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).
74. See Tuckish v. Pompano Motor Co., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1320 (S.D. Fla. 2004); In Re
Crown Auto Dealerships, Inc., 187 B.R. 1009, 1018 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995).
75. Zlotnick v. Premier Sales Grp., 480 F.3d 1281, 1284 (1lth Cir. 2007).
76. See Morris v. ADT Sec. Servs., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1309-10 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
77. See Grillasca v. Amerada Hess Corp., No. 8:05-cv-1736-T-17TGW, 2006 WL 3313719,
at *4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2006); Office of Attn'y Gen., Dep't of Legal Affairs v. Tenet
Healthcare, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1309 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
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FDUTPA complaints that fail to state how the alleged unfair, uncon-
scionable, or deceptive act or practice caused damage to the plaintiff are
subject to dismissal."
Florida state courts appear to have a more relaxed pleading stan-
dard than federal courts located in Florida. Several federal decisions
have required that FDUTPA plaintiffs comply with the enhanced plead-
ing standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), even though plead-
ing "fraud" is not necessary in a FDUTPA claim.7 9 State courts appear
to relax the pleading standard because it is not necessary to plead the
elements of fraud to allege a FDUTPA violation.so
C. Deceptive Acts and Practices
Most FDUTPA cases sound in deception or, at least, involve a
major deception component.8 ' FDUTPA, however, does not define
"deception." Consequently, in keeping with the Act's stated purpose, the
Eleventh Circuit, Florida's federal district courts, and the Florida state
courts have adopted the FTC's "deception" standard as interpreted under
federal regulatory and decisional law.
The FTC promulgated its current "deceptive act" definition in
1983. That year, the FTC issued its "Policy Statement on Deception,"
which synthesized prior case law concerning deception to offer a
"greater sense of certainty as to how the concept will be applied."82 The
policy created a "single definitive statement" as to what constitutes a
deceptive act.8 As defined by the FTC, any "representation, omission or
78. See Kais v. Mansiana Ocean Residences L.L.C, No. 08-21492-CIV, 2009 WL 825763, at
*1-2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2009); Macias, 694 So. 2d at 90.
79. See, e.g., D.H.G. Props., L.L.C. v. Ginn Cos., No. 3:09-cv-735-J-34JRK, 2010 WL
5584464, at *5 n.9 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2010) ("The Court need not determine the extent to which
FDUTPA claims in other contexts may or may not be subject to the heightened pleading
requirements of Rule 9(b); it suffices to recognize that the allegations of misrepresentation
comprising Plaintiffs FDUTPA claim in this action are grounded in fraud, and thus, required to
be plead with particularity."); Lawrie v. The Ginn Co., LLC, No. 3:09-cv-446-J-32JBT, 2010 WL
3746725, at *6 n.26 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2010) ("A consumer claim for violation of FDUTPA ...
must be pled with particularity pursuant to Rule 9(b)."). But see, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Co. v. Ft.
Myers Total Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1290 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (noting the trend to
apply Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard, but questioning whether this is appropriate under
FDUTPA); Third Party Verification, Inc. v. Signaturelink, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1327 (M.D.
Fla. 2007) (holding that the pleading need not satisfy Rule 9(b)'s heightened requirements); Fla.
Office of the Att'y Gen., Dep't of Legal Affairs v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1288,
1310 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (same).
80. See, e.g., Davis v. Powertel, Inc., 776 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) ("The plaintiff
need not prove the elements of fraud to sustain an action under the statute.").
81. See Federbush, supra note 22, at 22 ("Deception is by far the most employed prong of
Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.").
82. FTC DECEPTION POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 27.
83. Id.
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practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the
circumstances, to the consumer's detriment" would be deceptive.84 The
FTC formally adopted this definition in Cliffidale Associates, Inc."
Since the early 1980s, the federal courts have fleshed out the
nuances of deception.8 6 Deceptive acts, for example, need not be made
with the intent to deceive; it suffices that the acts were "likely to mis-
lead" the reasonable consumer." Similarly, a representation or practice
may be deceptive even if actual consumers were not deceived, provided
the reasonable consumer would likely have been deceived. As the FTC
explained, "[a]n interpretation may be reasonable even though it is not
shared by a majority of consumers in the relevant class, or by particu-
larly sophisticated consumers. A material practice that misleads a signif-
icant minority of reasonable consumers is deceptive."8 9
The Supreme Court of Florida and the Eleventh Circuit have fol-
lowed FTC precedent, stating that "deception" occurs under FDUTPA
when "there is a representation, omission, or practice that is likely to
mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the con-
sumer's detriment."90 Hence, the standard for whether a particular prac-
tice is "likely to mislead," and thereby deceptive, is an objective one,
based on a "reasonable relying consumer." 9' Unreasonable reliance war-
rants denial of a FDUTPA "deceptive act or practice" claim. Conse-
quently, in Millennium Communications & Fulfillment, Inc. v. Office of
the Attorney General,92 Florida's Third District Court of Appeal rejected
84. Id.
85. 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984); see also Amrep Corp. v. FTC, 768 F.2d 1171, 1178 (10th
Cir. 1985) (discussing the FTC's adoption of a new standard).
86. See, e.g., FTC v. Verity Int'l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 63 (2d Cir. 2006); Novartis Corp. v. FTC,
223 F.3d 783, 786 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1992).
87. Verity Int'l, 443 F.3d at 63.
88. FTC v. Freecom Commc'ns., Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1202, 1203 (10th Cir. 2005); Chroniak
v. Golden Inv. Corp., 983 F.2d 1140, 1147 n.13 (1st Cir. 1993); FTC v. Wilcox, 926 F. Supp.
1091, 1099 (S.D. Fla. 1995); United States v. Vend Direct, Inc., No. 06-cv-02423-MSK-MEH,
2007 WL 2176205, at *3 (D. Colo. May 11, 2007).
89. FTC DECEPTION POLICY STATEmENT, supra note 27, at n.4. This is not to say, however,
that a particular purchasing consumer could recover damages, or even that a damages class action
could be certified, on this basis alone. See, e.g., In re Motions to Certify Classes Against Court
Reporting Firms for Charges Relating to Word Indices, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1283-84 (S.D. Fla.
2010) (refusing to certify FDUTPA damages class, inter alia, because several putative class
members were aware of the alleged "deceptive" practice, accounted for it in their valuation of the
specified product/service, and addressed it in their negotiations with the sellers/purveyors of the
product/service). Those issues still require analysis of causation and injury, among other things.
See generally FLA. STAT. § 501.211(2) (2010).
90. Zlotnick v. Premier Sales Grp., 480 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting PNR, Inc.
v. Beacon Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 842 So. 2d 773, 777 (Fla. 2003)); see also Scott v. Capital One
Bank, No. 8:08-cv-132-T-30EAJ, 2008 WL 2157037, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 20, 2008).
91. See, e.g., Zlotnick, 480 F.3d at 1284.
92. 761 So. 2d 1256, 1264 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).
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an argument that the reasonable consumer would have been misled by
Millennium's offer of proprietary, catalogue-based credit cards. Though
the court recognized that factually accurate statements could deceive "by
innuendo," it concluded that Millennium's credit representations were
sufficiently clear that any conclusion by an actual consumer that the
credit card being offered was a Visa or MasterCard was "wishful
thinking.""
Similar to its FTC counterpart, the FDUTPA deception standard
requires a showing of "probable, not possible, deception that is likely to
cause injury to a reasonable relying consumer."9 4 A practice can be
deceptive even if it does not occur on a large scale; a deceptive act in
violation of FDUTPA can be predicated on a single transaction with a
lone consumer.95 Further, the act need not violate a rule or regulation to
be deceptive under FDUTPA.96 However, violations of certain provi-
sions, such as the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, may be
inherently deceptive.97
1. ExPREss REPRESENTATIONS
A deceptive-practice claim may be based on either affirmative rep-
resentations or omissions. Affirmative representations may be either
express or implied.98 Express contractual representations may be action-
able.99 The economic-loss rule does not bar FDUTPA causes of action
regarding transactions based on written contracts." Although contrac-
tual representations may serve as the basis for a FDUTPA claim, the
93. Id.
94. Zlotnick, 480 F.3d at 1284 (quoting Millennium, 761 So. 2d at 1263) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
95. See Rebman v. Follett Higher Educ. Grp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1279 (M.D. Fla. 2008);
PNR, 842 So. 2d at 775.
96. Fla. Office of the Att'y Gen., Dep't of Legal Affairs v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 420 F.
Supp. 2d 1288, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
97. See Gentry v. Harborage Cottages-Stuart, LLLP, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1256 (S.D. Fla.
2009) (stating that violations of ILSFDA are FDUTPA violations as well).
98. See, e.g., Millenium, 761 So. 2d at 1264 (noting that "deception may be accomplished by
innuendo rather than outright false statements").
99. See, e.g., Sundance Apartments 1, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 581 F. Supp. 2d 1215,
1220-21, 1225-26 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (refusing to dismiss FDUTPA claim premised on creation and
presentation of a deceptive contractual provision).
100. Delgado v. J.W. Courtesy Pontiac GMC-Truck, Inc., 693 So. 2d 602, 609-10 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1997); Sarkis v. Pafford Oil Co., 697 So. 2d 524, 528 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). The economic-
loss rule "does not permit the existence of a cause of action ... where the party, through the
utilization of traditional tort principles, seeks to recover only pure economic damages resulting
from the purchase of an allegedly defective product and the claim for damages is not accompanied
by any allegation that the product caused physical injury or damage to any other property."
Delgado, 693 So. 2d at 607; see also Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510
So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1987).
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FDUPTA claim cannot be premised on the same conduct and representa-
tions that are merely derivative of an unsuccessful contract claim. A
plaintiff may convert a breach-of-contract claim into a FDUTPA claim,
but the FDUTPA claim must allege that the act underlying the breach,
regardless of any contractual agreement, constituted an unfair, uncon-
scionable, or deceptive trade act or practice. 101 Thus, challenging an act
only to the extent that it constitutes a contractual breach does not pro-
duce an actionable FDUTPA claim.10 2 As Florida's Fifth District Court
of Appeal observed: "To hold otherwise would allow every failed breach
of contract claim to morph into a . . . FDUTPA claim. The well-estab-
lished laws governing contracts should not be so casually dismissed."103
Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal similarly noted that the "tac-
tic" of injecting deceptive-practice claims into a contractual dispute
"complicates a lawsuit, raises the stakes, and increases the litigation
expenses." It further stated that it "[had] encountered few cases where
such claims were successful.""
Courts often hold that it is unreasonable to rely on misrepresenta-
tions that precede or contradict a written agreement. In TRG Night Hawk
Ltd. v. Registry Development Corp.,'05 for example, Florida's Second
District Court of Appeal reversed a finding that the seller in a real-estate
transaction had violated FDUTPA, holding instead that the buyer could
not have reasonably relied on the seller's oral misrepresentations
because the contract terms were inconsistent with these oral state-
ments. 10 6 As the court explained, "a party who signs a contract whose
terms contradict the alleged misrepresentations on which he relied is
barred 'from seeking relief pursuant to FDUTPA, as he acted unreasona-
bly.'"10 Likewise, in Rosa v. Amoco Oil Co.,' the Southern District of
Florida dismissed the plaintiffs FDUTPA claim, holding that the plain-
tiff's reliance on allegedly false oral statements, which were at variance
with written documents, was unreasonable as a matter of law.'" How-
101. Rebman v. Follett Higher Educ. Grp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1278-79 (M.D. Fla. 2008)
(granting summary judgment and concluding that college bookstore's rounding practices did not
violate FDUTPA because the only basis for complaint was that this rounding resulted in prices
inconsistent with contract provisions).
102. Id. at 1279.
103. Bankers Trust Co. v. Basciano, 960 So. 2d 773, 777-78 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (reversing
judgment in favor of plaintiff on FDUTPA claim based on pre-contract communications that never
materialized into a contract).
104. Mandel v. Decorator's Mart, Inc. of Deerfield Beach, 965 So. 2d 311, 313 n.l (Fla. 4th
DCA 2007).
105. 17 So. 3d 782 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).
106. Id. at 784-85.
107. Id. at 784 (quoting Rosa v. Amoco Oil Co., 262 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1368 (S.D. Fla. 2003)).
108. 262 F. Supp. 2d 1364.
109. Id. at 1368-69; accord Mac-Gray Servs., Inc. v. DeGeorge, 913 So. 2d 630, 634 (Fla. 4th
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ever, when contractual disclaimers do not directly contradict the alleg-
edly deceptive representations, FDUTPA claims have at least withstood
motions to dismiss, with courts reasoning that the disclaimer did not
necessarily diminish the probability that a reasonable consumer would
be deceived if other evidence could establish the making of false or
fraudulent promises."o
Non-contractual express representations may also be actionable.
For example, Florida's Third District Court of Appeal held that a car
dealer's sales pitch that a vehicle was priced at $26,500 because it was a
special, limited edition, when the suggested sticker price actually was
$21,689, was actionable under FDUTPA.111 Such express representa-
tions may also occur indirectly, such as through advertisements.
Recently, the Southern District of Florida upheld a FDUTPA claim
against a chewing-gum company, which represented that its product
contained a natural ingredient that was "scientifically proven to help kill
the germs that cause bad breath," because the plaintiffs alleged that this
claim lacked scientific proof, and the defendant charged a premium for
the particular brand of gum based on this representation.1 12
2. IMPLIED REPRESENTATIONS
A classic type of implied representation subject to FDUTPA is the
"bait and switch." A "bait and switch" scenario involves the implication
that the offer to sell the baiting product is bona fide when in fact it is
not, and the seller actually wishes to pressure the buyer into purchasing
something else (usually something that is more expensive and/or
includes fewer or less desirable features). Such an implied representation
is clearly deceptive. 1 ' In Department of Legal Affairs v. Father and Son
DCA 2005) (same); see also Gentry v. Harborage Cottages-Stuart, LLLP, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1239,
1257 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (stating in the context of an action under Florida Statutes section 718.506
that "'[R]eliance on fraudulent misrepresentations is unreasonable as a matter of law where the
alleged misrepresentations contradict the express terms of the ensuing written agreement"')
(alteration in original) (quoting Garcia v. Santa Maria Resort, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1295
(S.D. Fla. 2007))).
110. See Sewell v. D'Alessandro & Woodyard, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1252-53 (M.D.
Fla. 2010) (upholding denial to dismiss FDUTPA claims despite inadmissibility of most parol
evidence); Sewell v. D'Alessandro & Woodyard, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1258 (M.D. Fla.
2009) (denying motion to dismiss); see also Morris v. ADT Sec. Servs., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1305,
1311 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
111. Suris v. Gilmore Liquidating, Inc., 651 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (reversing
directed verdict for car dealer and remanding for jury determination of FDUTPA claim).
112. Smith v. Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., 663 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1337-38 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
113. See Fendrich v. RBF, L.L.C., 842 So. 2d 1076, 1079 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); see also FTC
Guides Against Bait Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 238.0 (2010) ("Bait advertising is an alluring but
insincere offer to sell a product or service which the advertiser in truth does not intend or want to
sell. Its purpose is to switch consumers from buying the advertised merchandise, in order to sell
something else, usually at a higher price or on a basis more advantageous to the advertiser. The
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Moving & Storage, Inc.114 for example, plaintiffs alleged that Father
and Son Moving's practice of providing customers with "low ball" mov-
ing estimates, and then tacking on additional charges at the time of
delivery and payment, constituted a deceptive "bait and switch" prac-
tice."' Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal suggested that this
practice could violate FDUTPA because "customers of Father and Son
were confronted with the Hobson's choice of paying an amount far in
excess of what was estimated, or risk not being given their belongings
from the moving truck."'1 6 Likewise, in Fendrich v. RBF, L.L.C.,117 the
Fourth District reversed the trial court's dismissal of a deceptive-prac-
tice claim, which alleged that the plaintiff reserved a particular lot for
purchase at a particular price and was then offered a contract for an
inferior lot at a higher price. " Because a reservation form could com-
municate that the consumer would be able to purchase the reserved lot at
a firm price, it might mislead the reasonable consumer by implication
despite express language in the form that it did not create any obliga-
tions for either the consumer or the seller.119
3. OMissioNs
Omissions of material information may also be actionable when a
disclosure is necessary to prevent a claim, practice, or transaction from
being misleading. In Marino v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 20 the Southern
District of Florida acknowledged that the plaintiff alleged a theory of
deception through omission in claiming that Home Depot's deceptive
act was its failure to disclose how it calculated carpet-installation
costs. 121 Although omissions may be deceptive, the court denied plain-
tiff's request for class certification for such deception, explaining:
Each class member would have to state whether or not a Home Depot
employee informed him of the pricing calculation, and then the
Defendant would have to refute that [contention] . .. .This process
would result in numerous "mini-trials" on the issue of whether the
first element of a FDUTPA claim had occurred. 122
primary aim of a bait advertisement is to obtain leads as to persons interested in buying
merchandise of the type so advertised.").
114. 643 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
115. Id. at 22-23, 26.
116. Id. at 25.
117. 842 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).
118. Id. at 1079-80.
119. See id.
120. 245 F.R.D. 729 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
121. Id. at 737.
122. Id.
1100 [Vol. 65:1083
2011] FLORIDA'S DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT 1101
D. Unfair Acts and Practices
1. THE MODERN FTC "UNFAIRNESS" TEST
As noted above, "unfair" acts and practices constitute a separate
subcategory of prohibited business behavior, and an act or practice may
be "'unfair' without being 'deceptive."' 12 3 Nevertheless, individual and
class-based FDUTPA suits generally focus on "deception."124 Indeed,
one commentator has described FDUTPA's "unfairness" subcategory as
"an available yet neglected and misunderstood basis for state, individual,
and commercial litigation." 25
In the early 1980s, the FTC provided a revised definition for "con-
sumer unfairness," which Congress later codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(n):
An act or practice is only unfair if it "causes or is likely to cause sub-
stantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by con-
sumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or to competition."l 26 As previously noted, the FTC's Unfair-
ness Policy Statement divides this test into three components: "[1] [The
act or practice] must be substantial; [2] it must not be outweighed by any
countervailing benefits to consumers or competition that the practice
produces; and [3] it must be an injury that consumers themselves could
not reasonably have avoided."127
Despite this revised FTC standard, many Florida state and federal
decisions discussing "unfairness" still refer to the prior, more amorphous
standard, which the FTC has abandoned: "An unfair practice is 'one that
offends established public policy' and one that is 'immoral, unethical,
oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.' "128
Given (1) that FDUTPA incorporates by reference FTC regulatory stan-
dards, and (2) that federal precedent recognizes the modern "unfairness"
standard, Florida's "unfairness" test is ripe for an update. Recently, the
Southern District of Florida appears to have provided that update.
In In re Motions to Certify Classes Against Court Reporting Firms
for Charges Relating to Word Indices ("Court Reporters"),1 29 the South-
123. Federbush, supra note 20, at 26.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006); see also FTC UNFAIRNESS POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 28.
127. FTC UNFAIRNESS POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 28.
128. See, e.g., BR-Ill Imps. & Exps., Inc. v. Indusparquet Industria E Comercio De Madeiras,
LTDA, No. 10-22206-Civ, 2010 WL 4317021, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2010) (citing a pre-1980
decision, PNR, Inc. v. Beacon Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 842 So. 2d 773, 777 (Fla. 2003)) (quoting
Samuels v. King Motor Co. of Ft. Lauderdale, 782 So. 2d 489, 499 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)); Spiegel,
Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 293 (7th Cir. 1976)) (attributing this standard to decisions interpreting
the FTC Act, which, in fact, has abandoned this test).
129. 715 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1277-78 & n.3 (S.D. Fla. 2010). Mr. Allen and Carlton Fields,
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em District of Florida recognized that the phraseology of the federal and
Florida "unfairness" standards differs and then applied the contemporary
federal standard as outlined in 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). Court Reporters
involved "unfairness" and "deception" claims through which the plain-
tiffs attempted to certify a class challenging court-reporting firms'
alleged overcharging for index pages appended to transcripts. In refusing
to certify the class, the court addressed the three prongs of the current
FTC "consumer unfairness" test.13 0
First, the court determined that any overcharges were "reasonably
avoidable" because the consumers could have "request[ed] that the
court-reporting firms omit (or charge a different per-page rate for) the
indices from any transcripts they order" or used the invoices "to easily
discover that the charge for index pages was the same as the charge for
other pages."' 3 1 In addition, it explained that those prospective "class
members who negotiated special rates likely had an additional opportu-
nity to avoid or reduce index charges."' 32
Next, the court applied the "countervailing benefits to users" ele-
ment of the current FTC "unfairness" standard. Specifically, it deter-
mined that "[t]he potential value of [transcript] indices to users varies
greatly," but the class definition failed to account for differences
between consumers as to the value they might place on index pages. 133
This aspect of the "unfairness" inquiry counseled against certification.
Finally, the Court Reporters court found that some of these con-
sumers could not satisfy the "substantial injury" element because "dif-
ferent attorneys value word indices differently[, and] [t]hose attorneys
(or the ultimate payors) who value word indices would be uninjured."' 34
The order denying class certification in Court Reporters appears to be
the first reported FDUTPA case in which a Florida state or federal court
applied the three-pronged, contemporary FTC "unfairness" standard, as
is required under Florida Statutes section 501.203(3)(b).' 3 5 In this
regard, Court Reporters is a significant example of a federal court devel-
oping FDUTPA doctrine and might portend the eventual wholesale
adoption of the FTC's modern "unfairness" standard in Florida
P.A., represent U.S. Legal Support, Inc. in Court Reporters, which is now pending on appeal
before the Eleventh Circuit. See Case Nos. 10-12943-GG, 10-12944-GG & 10-12998-GG.
130. Id. at 1277-80.
131. Id. at 1277-78.
132. Id. at 1278.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1279-80.
135. Section 501.203(3)(b) expressly states that a FDUTPA "violation" includes a violation of
"[tihe standards of unfairness ... set forth and interpreted by the [FTC]" as of "July 1, 2006,"
which necessarily requires application of the FTC's modem unfairness standard because the FTC
adopted that standard in 1980. See FTC UNFAIRNEsS POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 28.
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FDUTPA case law.1 3 6
2. VIOLATIONS OF SPECIFIC FTC RULES
Pursuant to the FTC Act, the FTC has also adopted a wide variety
of rules that describe "unfair" conduct. These rules appear in 16 C.F.R.
chapter 1, subchapter D, entitled "Trade Regulation Rules.""' Florida
Statutes section 501.203(3)(a) creates a private right of action for viola-
tion of these rules even though none exists under the FTC Act itself.'38
These rules address numerous consumer and business-transaction areas,
including consumer credit, franchise relationships, the funeral industry,
eye examinations and prescriptions, used-car sales, and aspects of home
sales.'13 There is disagreement among commentators as to whether rules
promulgated by the FTC pursuant to statutes other than the FTC Act can
also provide a basis for FDUTPA violations. 40
E. Unconscionability
Similar to "unfairness," "unconscionability" appears to constitute a
separate subcategory of prohibited business behavior. In 1993, the Flor-
ida Legislature amended FDUTPA to forbid "unconscionable" acts or
practices and to provide a corresponding cause of action for damages
caused by such behavior.' 4 ' However, the Legislature did not define the
term "unconscionable" as used in FDUTPA, and unlike "deception" and
"unfairness," the FTC has not independently provided a consumer-pro-
tection definition for this term.'42
Nevertheless, Florida appellate decisions involving FDUTPA have
construed "unconscionability" in the context of deciding whether to
136. Court Reporters also provided a parallel analysis of the "unfairness" issue under the
older, more amorphous FTC standard, which the Supreme Court of Florida quoted in dicta in
PNR, Inc. v. Beacon Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 842 So. 2d 773, 777 (Fla. 2003). See Court Reporters, 715
F. Supp. 2d at 1280.
137. Federbush, supra note 20, at 32; see also Trade Regulation Rules, 16 C.F.R.
§§ 410.1-460.24 (2010).
138. Nieman v. Dryclean U.S.A. Franchise Co., 178 F.3d 1126, 1128-31 (1lth Cir. 1999)
(recognizing that FDUTPA "defines a violation of that law to include violations of rules
promulgated pursuant to the [FTC] Act" but refusing to apply FDUTPA and the FTC's Franchise
Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 436 (1998), extraterritorially to alleged acts in Argentina).
139. Federbush, supra note 20, at 33.
140. Compare Federbush, supra note 20, at 33 ("By FDUTPA's terms, rules issued by the FTC
pursuant to laws other than the FTC Act . . . as well as FTC industry 'guides' . . . would appear
not to provide a basis for FDUTPA violations." (internal citations omitted)), with Fistos, supra
note 4, at 64 ("[T]hey should be equal fodder for per se treatment.").
141. See FLA. STAT. §§ 501.204(1), .211(2); 1993 Fla. Laws 38, § 3.
142. Federbush, supra note 29, at 49-50.
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enforce a contract's mandatory arbitration provisions. 143 In Hialeah
Auto, L.L.C. v. Basulto, Florida's Third District Court of Appeal applied
the established dual "procedural" and "substantive" unconscionability
test and decided that the subject agreement was unconscionable because
it attempted to waive the buyer's right to seek punitive damages.'" In
S.D.S. Autos Inc. v. Chrzanowski, Florida's First District Court of
Appeal ruled that an arbitration clause was unconscionable because it
purported to waive the right to seek class-action relief.'4' Neither case
defined an act as unconscionable under FDUTPA; both simply deter-
mined whether a given contract requiring arbitration was unconsciona-
ble. Of note, in Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,14 6 the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals certified dispositive questions of state law to
the Supreme Court of Florida in a FDUTPA case involving prospective
class claims that a mobile-phone carrier unlawfully charged the plain-
tiffs roaming fees and that the arbitration and class-action waiver provi-
sions of their contracts were unconscionable. The case is currently
pending before the Supreme Court of Florida and will likely clarify Flor-
ida's "unconscionability" doctrine.147 Oral argument took place on
Thursday, February 10, 2011.148
Additionally, in Office of Attorney General, Department of Legal
Affairs v. Commerce Commercial Leasing,'4 9 Florida's First District
Court of Appeal held that the state Attorney General sufficiently pled an
"unconscionable" act under FDUTPA when it brought an action against
equipment-leasing companies, alleging (1) that the defendants were run-
ning a Ponzi scheme; (2) that the defendants acted in conjunction with a
telecommunications company to sell grossly overpriced telecommunica-
tion equipment to small, unsophisticated businesses; (3) that the rental
agreements failed to disclose they were being simultaneously and imme-
diately assigned; and (4) that the equipment was not delivered in work-
ing order. This appears to be the only Florida case directly addressing
what may constitute an "unconscionable" act or practice under
143. Hialeah Auto., L.L.C. v. Basulto, 22 So. 3d 586 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); S.D.S. Autos Inc. v.
Chrzanowski, 976 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
144. See Basulto, 22 So. 3d at 590. Punitive damages are not provided for in FDUTPA.
However, the court felt the agreement was unconscionable for preventing the plaintiff from
seeking punitive damages under other theories or causes of action.
145. See Chrzanowski, 976 So. 2d at 603-11.
146. 592 F.3d 1119, 1135 (11th Cir. 2010).
147. Case No. SCIO-19 (argued Feb. 10, 2011). The Florida Supreme Court's docket is
available electronically at http://jweb.flcourts.org/pls/docket/ds-docket search%20 (last visited
Mar. I1, 2011).
148. Oral Argument, Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., (No. SCIO-19) (argued Feb. 10, 2011),
available at http://wfsu.org/gavel2gavel/archives/flash/10-19.php.
149. 946 So. 2d 1253, 1258-59 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
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FDUTPA. However, in its analysis, the First District seems to have sub-
sumed "unconscionability" into the "likely to deceive a consumer" stan-
dard, which is already used to determined whether an act or practice is
"deceptive."' 50 The decision did not define "unconscionability" with ref-
erence to existing statutory"' or case-law definitions for this term. In
other words, Commerce Commercial Leasing does not appear to ascribe
any independent meaning to the term "unconscionable," but rather, has
defined it in the same manner as "deceptiveness."
Reading FDUTPA in this manner likely violates a well-recognized
cannon of statutory construction: Florida statutes should not be read in a
manner that renders any of their terms superfluous.15 2 Therefore, the
courts or the Legislature should provide better guidance as to what con-
stitutes an "unconscionable" act or practice under FDUTPA. Otherwise,
the Act's "unconscionability" language may face viable vagueness
challenges:
The language and legislative history of FDUTPA simply do not per-
mit any clear legislative intent as to the meaning of the term "uncon-
scionable," as added by the 1993 amendments, to be discerned
beyond those instances where the term appears in another statute.
Unlike FDUTPA's "deceptive" and "unfair," which the Florida
Supreme Court in 1976 held to have meanings sufficiently well set-
tled in federal trade regulation law to satisfy the requirements of due
process, its use of "unconscionable" fails to give adequate guidance
to potential defendants as to what practices are and are not covered.
FDUTPA's use of "unconscionable" thus poses a vagueness problem
of constitutional dimension.' 3
F. "Per Se" FDUTPA Violations
In addition to examining the established FTC definitions for
"deceptive" and "unfair," and the somewhat-nebulous term "uncon-
scionable," one may look to certain statutes, ordinances, and regulations
that expressly or impliedly codify so-called "per se" FDUTPA viola-
tions.15 4 As previously mentioned, the FTC's rules addressing unfairness
150. See id.
151. Cf, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 672.302 (2010) (providing an "unconscionability" defense in
contract actions governed by the Uniform Commercial Code).
152. "[W]ords in a statute are not to be construed as superfluous if a reasonable construction
exists that gives effect to all words." State v. Bodden, 877 So. 2d 680, 686 (Fla. 2004).
153. Federbush, supra note 29, at 54 (footnotes omitted). The 1976 Florida Supreme Court
decision that the author refers to is Dep't of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1976).
154. See generally Fistos, supra note 4, at 62. See also Taviere v. Precision Motor Cars, Inc.,
No. 8:09-cv-467-T-TBM, 2010 WL 557347, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2010) ("[FDUTPA] can be
violated in two ways: (1) a per se violation premised on the violation of another law proscribing
unfair or deceptive practice, and (2) adopting an unfair or deceptive practice.").
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memorialize one type of "per se" violation."' Further, FDUTPA also
states that the violation of "[a]ny law, statute, rule, regulation, or ordi-
nance which proscribes unfair methods of competition, or unfair, decep-
tive, or unconscionable acts or practices" constitutes a FDUTPA
violation.15 6 Based on this statutory language, some commentators pre-
dicted that violations of a broad range of Florida or federal laws address-
ing consumer protection could therefore constitute predicates for
FDUTPA violations. 5 7
This has proven prescient because federal courts sitting in Florida
have recognized that violations of certain consumer-protection laws do,
in fact, serve as FDUTPA predicates. Indeed, statutes, regulations,
and ordinances may provide FDUTPA predicates under section
501.203(3)(c) in two ways.' 58 First, a statute, regulation, or ordinance's
text may expressly state that it serves as a FDUTPA predicate.' 9 Sec-
ond, a court may find that such a law prohibits unfair and deceptive
trade acts or practices and therefore operates as an implied FDUTPA
predicate.' 6 0 However, the predicate law must directly "proscribe[ ]
unfair methods of competition, or unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable
acts or practices."' 6 1 If not, the law cannot supply the predicate for a
FDUTPA violation.162 For instance, violations of the Interstate Land
155. See FLA. STAT. § 501.203(3)(a) (2010) (defining a FDUTPA violation as a violation of
"[a]ny rules promulgated pursuant to the [FTC] Act, 15 U.S.C. ss. 41 et seq.").
156. § 501.203(3)(c).
157. Fistos, supra note 4, at 63-66.
158. Parr v. Maesbury Homes, Inc., No. 6:09-cv-1268-Orl-19GJK, 2009 WL 5171770, at *7-8
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2009) (dismissing action alleging per se FDUTPA violations predicated on
purported violations of the federal Securities Act, the Florida Securities Act, and Florida Statutes
chapter 718 because plaintiffs failed to allege that these statutory violations caused them harm).
159. See Fistos, supra note 4, at 63 n.9 (noting that as of 2002, at least seventeen Florida
statutes provided an explicit FDUTPA predicate and collecting statutes); see also, e.g., FLA. STAT.
§§ 210.185(5) (cigarette distribution), 316.2128(2) (sale of motorized scooters), 320.27(2) (auto
sales), 400.464(4)(c) (licensing of home health agencies), 559.3906 (violations of "Buying
Services" Act), 560.309(10) (regulation of check cashing and currency exchange businesses),
560.406(2) (passing of worthless checks), 627.736(1 1)(b) (regulation of "personal injury
protection" benefits), 668.6075 (regulation of commercial emails/electronic communication),
681.111 (auto warranties), 817.487(5)(b) (provision of false telephone caller ID information),
817.62(3)(c) (illegally factoring credit-card transactions) (2010).
160. Parr, 2009 WL 5171770, at *7; Tippens v. Round Island Plantation, L.L.C., No. 09-CV-
14036, 2009 WL 2365347, at *11 (S.D. Fla. July 31, 2009).
161. § 501.203(3)(c).
162. Double AA Int'l. Inv. Grp., v. Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1358
(S.D. Fla. 2009) (recognizing that an alleged violation of Florida Statutes section 718.202 (2010)
(which addresses pre-closing condo deposits) cannot serve as a FDUTPA predicate because the
Legislature did not design section 718.202 to proscribe deceptive or unfair trade acts or practices);
Feheley v. LAI Games Sales, Inc., No. 08-23060-CIV, 2009 WL 2474061, at *3-5 (S.D. Fla. Aug.
11, 2009) (finding that Florida Statutes section 849.15 (2010), a criminal statute prohibiting illegal
slot machines, could not serve as a per se FDUTPA predicate because section 849.15 did not
contain an express declaration that its violation also constituted a FDUTPA violation and, further,
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Sales Full Disclosure Act ("ILSFDA")16 3 have been held to constitute
implied, per se FDUTPA violations because ILSFDA, by its own terms,
also proscribes unfair or deceptive acts or practices."
It is important to bear in mind, however, that while per se status
satisfies the first element of a private FDUTPA claim, "a plaintiff is still
required to plead the remaining two elements, causation and damages, in
order to properly state a claim for a FDUTPA violation."'
III. CONCLUSION
Based on this overview of the tests necessary to establish deceptive,
unfair, or unconscionable trade acts or practices, it is apparent that pri-
vate FDUTPA actions are often heavily influenced by federal law and
have the potential to be incredibly varied and broad. Further, despite
FDUTPA's existence for nearly four decades, a number of basic, yet
significant issues remain subject to development, such as what the
appropriate test is for measuring "unfairness," what the Legislature
intended by adding "unconscionable" trade acts and practices as a sepa-
rate category of prohibited business behavior in 1993, and which stat-
utes, regulations, and ordinances, specifically, may serve as implied,
"per se" FDUTPA predicates. If the past is any type of prologue for the
future of FDUTPA case law, it is safe to assume that Florida's federal
district courts and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals will play a
prominent role in providing some answers.
there was no evidence the statute existed to proscribe unfair or deceptive acts vis-a-vis
consumers); Edgewater by the Bay, LLLP v. Gaunchez (In re Edgewater by the Bay, LLLP), 419
B.R. 511, 516 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009) ("Violations of laws or statutes that give rise to a FDUTPA
claim must be of the kind that proscribe unfair trade practices or unfair methods of competition;
not . . . a violation of any law or statute that may have some benefit to consumers.").
163. Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20 (2006).
164. See, e.g., Meitis v. Park Square Enters., Inc., No. 6:08-cv-1080-Orl-22GJK, 2009 WL
703273, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2009); Dolphin, L.L.C. v. WCI Cmtys., Inc., No. 07-80241-CIV,
2008 WL 6894512, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 20, 2008); cf Taylor v. Homecomings Fin., LLC, 738 F.
Supp. 2d 1257, 1264 (N.D. Fla. 2010) ("At least in some circumstances, a FDUTPA violation. . .
may be based upon the federal Truth in Lending Act [15 U.S.C. §§1601-67f (2006)], a rule
adopted under that act by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, or a published
interpretation of that act by the Federal Reserve System's Division of Consumer and Community
Affairs.").
165. Parr, 2009 WL 5171770, at *8.
